Panel only report net benefits, which makes it quite difficult to compare them with national aggregates. Muffels, et. al (1990: 189-190) show that the panel is more representative than the Income Statistics, but still there is underrepresentation of unemployment benefits (83 qo has been reported), disability benefits (92 q) and public old-age pensions (90 q). On the other hand, social assistance benefits have been overrepresented (116 qo).
We have chosen a third alternative, to wit dynamic microsimulation. Here, the microsimulation technique is used to reconstruct the social security contributions and receipts in the Netherlands from 1947 on and to simulate future contributions and receipts. It has also been used to simulate or reconstruct the social security benefits and contributions in the year 1991. We compare the redistributive impact of the social security system for that particular year with the lifetime incidence for the birth generations 1930 and 1950. This is the subject of section 5. In the first instance we discuss the lifetime income concept in section 2. Thereafter we give a brief description of the Dutch social security system (section 3). Then we go into the microsimulation approach and discuss the microsimulation model used (section 4).
Annual or lifetime income.
To gain insight into the relative positions of persons or groups of persons, it does not suffice to look at the order in a specific year. The income level and its composition in a certain year depends too much on chance. The transitory income has a large impact on income over ã Derived from tables from the Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics and Department of Social Affairs (1993) . limited period. According to Friedman (1957) , 15 to 30 q of the variance in household incomes in urban areas can be explained by transitory income elements. Since the 1950s, this percentage has probably even risen. The income flow over a longer period is subjected to this albeit to a lesser extent. In addition to past experiences, future expectations are also important. In particular, if one analyses social security schemes, because`... the social services typically involve payments by workers to support nonworkers such as children, pensioners, the sick or the unemployed. Since individuals do not remain in these dependent categories throughout their lives, current beneficiaries will, at other times, be supporting people who are similar to themselves but at a different stage of their life-cycle or of their fortunes...' [Layard (1977: 46) ].
Here, we find another argument against the use of a limited period in our analysis: the impact of the social security system on the income distribution of each individual also depends on the stage of the life-cycle the individual is in at that particular moment. Income differences between persons at one moment in time can be compensated for in another period. Both Deleeck (1974) and Pestieau (1990) give an example of a society in which each income increases with age and by the same proportion. Imagine a society where the initial income, the age at which the initial income is earned and the age of dying do not differ; all the young people in this society would be relatively poor, and all the old people relatively rich. The income distribution, as measured at any time, would be unequal. However, the income distribution on a lifetime basis would be completely equal. Each individual would receive the same income during his or her life. See also Fullerton and Rogers (1994: 10-11) . Lillard (1977: 42) gives analogous reasons:`... among recent entrants into the labour force low earnings may reflect high levels of investment in training which will be compensated by high earnings at later stages of the life cycle...'. The situation is reversed for those who cannot invest optimally in this area. Income differences can be caused by differences in earning capacity. A cross-section analysis does not allow us to distinguish between these sources of income differences.
Another point is that some forms of public expenditure -like education and employment programmes -bear the character of an investment, through which the complete gain is only partly measured. Generally, one can say that income differences on an annual basis are partly the consequence of differences in human capital investments [see Mincer (1974) ]. A fourth objection against the use of annual incomes is that the integral public income policy is not 3 exclusively focused on annual incomes. A practical rather than a methodological objection is that non-positive incomes are not considered. Focusing on the redistributive impact of social security schemes, another important -maybe even the most important -argument is that a`... pure social insurance system will significantly affect the pattern in which income is received over an individual's lifetime, but will have no impact on income distribution across individuals ... it does not represent an increase in the well-being of some individuals at the expense of others but merely a change in the timing of income receipt across individual lifetimes...' [Burkhauser and Warlick (1981: 403) ]. Of course, the social security system does not merely consist of pure social insurances, but insurance elements are present in at least a part of almost all schemes (not including the pure welfare programmes, like some social assistance schemes).
Some additional arguments stem from Aaron (1977) and Cohen and Friedman (1972) . Persons from high income classes generally start working at a later age and have a higher life expectancy than persons from low income classes. Consequently, the former pay contributions during a shorter period, but receive certain types of benefits (e.g. old-age pensions) during a longer period. Certain contributions are tax-deductable, which favours high incomes. This is strengthened by the progressive nature of the tax system. As a consequence, annual income groups differ from lifetime income groups, for the same individual [see Fullerton and Rogers (1994: 13) ].
Although the aforementioned arguments favour the use of the lifetime approach, its application is quite limited. This is the result of both practical and methodological problems. The most important practical problem is the lack of sufficient data. Only in the United States do we find longitudinal income data, covering a sufficiently large sample over a long period-. Usually, a cross-section approach is used to solve this problem. However, this approach gives a distorted picture of lifetime income [see e.g. Nelissen (1987: 60 and 63) for the Netherlands]. It does not take the career effect, technological developments, changes in the demand-supply proportions of types of labour, and so on into account.
The two main methodological objections raised against using the lifetime income concept are the uncertainty, with respect to future income flows, and the valuation of the elements of the income flow in the course of time [see Ritzen (1979: 94-98 when we use the lifetime income approach for persons still living. Uncertainty about their future incomes will continue to exist, irrespective of the methods and models used. There are always factors which cannot be predicted. The other problem, the valuation of the income flowsideally measured by the consumption streams -with respect to each other in the course of time, is that not everyone has the same risk aversion. In practice, we cannot use different utility functions to suit each individual. The problem escalates when we are talking about a perfect capital market, because this implies that persons with consumption streams having the same present value at a given discount rate can have different utility and different present value for their discounted incomes. Layard (1977) shows that a low discount rate justifies the resulting issue best. Another possibility is to get an idea of the problem by using several alternative discount rates.
Other objections against using lifetime income are [see Von Weisz~cker (1978) , especially the discussion of the paper]:
Transfers between different times in the life-cycle incur costs, both in a material and an immaterial sense; -People are generally unable to value events up to the end of their lives, which argues for a high discount rate; -The expectatíon of a high income in the future does not remove the current poverty.
It is clear that both the annual and lifetime income concepts contain inadequacies. We consider here the lifetime approach as a supplement to annual analysis, as "... a way of assessing the long-run distributional effects (.., that) can play a valuable role in policymaking, as long as it is viewed as a supplement to, and not a replacement for, annual incidence calculations" [Fullerton and Rogers (1994: 28 and 29) ].
3. The Dutch social security system.
The current definition of social security (in its broad sense) in the Netherlands, considers social security as the totality of legal measures which are aimed at guaranteeing continuity in the Nelissen (1991 Nelissen ( , 1993 Nelissen ( and 1994 ] -is a dynamic cross-sectional model.
Dynamic microsimulation stems initially from the ideas of Orcutt [see Orcutt et al (1976) and (1986)]. An overview of the ins and outs of the microsimulation approach, especially with respect to social policy, can be found in Citro and Hanushek (1991) . The dynamic approach implies that demographic processes are explicitly simulated, which means that the size of the micro database changes during the simulation period. The sample passes through time year by year. For each person contained in the micro database we examine which personal characteristics change, and to what extent, each year. The principle of microsimulation is simple. To illustrate this, we will use the modelling of mortality. The decision, whether an individual will or will not undergo a potential transition, is simulated with the aid of the Monte Carlo method. In view of this, the conditional probability of an individual undergoing that event has to be given. For example, in 1968 the probability for a 77-year-old divorced woman of dying is 6.75~. We then draw at random a number from the uniform [0,1] distribution. If this number is smaller than or equal to 0.0675 (the probability of dying), the woman is expected to die. If the number is larger than 0.0675, the woman will remain alive. If she dies, we then check to see if she had dependent children (who have become orphans). So, decisions (or events) at the level of an índividual can have implications for other individuals. Microsimulation creates a synthetic database which reflects the (developments in the) demographic and economic structure of the population. A stylised example is given in Figure 1 .
[
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE ]
At the heart of microsimulation modelling is its state representation of the components of the system of interest. To execute this representation, first draw a list of attributes for each indivídual in the sample. Next, after the adaptation of a micro-representation, specify an initial population. Using a real sample of individuals and households along with their attributes would have been preferable, however, such a sample is not available. A first useable sample can be derived from the 1947 Census data [see Nelissen (1991 and 1994) ]. So, the model simulates all events from 1947. Each year the characteristics of the individuals (and thus the households) are updated, if necessarry. The modules which are used in the current version of NEDYMAS are given in Table 1 .
[ (1984) . It will be assumed here that national income grows annually by 2q, which is in accordance with the long-term economic projections by the Dutch Central Planning Agency [see Central Planning Agency (1992) ]. Further, it should be noted, that from 1991 onwards, the social security contributions are determined endogeneously on the basis of the simulated benefits and income. A comparison of simulated data with real data can be found in Nelissen (1991 and .
The purpose of this study implies that we want to gain more insight into welfare distribution. Thus, the model will have to take into account the consumption possibilities of households and to consider welfare differences between various types of households. To make the welfare positions of different types of households comparable, equivalent income must be used.
Economists disagree on this issue and on which equivalence scale should be used. Research in the field of lifetime redistribution inclines towards the application of equivalence scales. With respect to the choice of the equivalence scales, it holds that other scales (e.g. empirical-objective methods) do not result in other conclusions. Of course, the exact figures differ, but the direction of the results does not. See, for a discussion, Coulter, Cowell and Jenkins (1992) . We use the results of Diederen (1983) , who applies an empirical-subjective approach. The equivalence scate is applied to each income component and the sum of all the equivalent income components is imputed each year to each individual in the household unit. This implies that the income measure takes full account of the variance in household circumstances by attributing the standard of ]iving of the household to each individual residing in that household. For a further discussion, see Harding (1993: 51-55) . Lifetime income (or beneiit or contribution) is measured by the sum of the (discounted) annual equivalent income (or benefit or contribution) amounts.
This can be considered as a type of (discounted) lifetime utility, where the utility function has been defined as:
We refer to this as equivalent (lifetime) income in stead of lifetime utility. In interpreting the results one should bear this in mind. The income components have been adjusted for the household composition (via the equivalence scale) and the resulting amounts have been adjusted for changes in the wage index and discounted to 1990, using a discount rate of 4~. Moreover, persons who were involved in migration have been excluded in our calculations for the lifetime Further, it is assumed that the burden of benefits (contributions) is fully incident upon the person who receives (pays) the benefit (contribution). This follows standard practice in major incidence studies [see Reynolds and Smolensky (1977) and Central Statistical Office (1990) ].
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE ]
The extent to which the model covers the various schemes in 1991 has been shown in Table 2 .
There we also present the coverage by the other alternatives (Income Statistics or panel data).
See also Section 1. Bearing in mind that the figures for NEDYMAS have been based on a simulation that starts in 1947, we find that the coverage by NEDYMAS is much more extensive than that by the Income Statistics or the Socio-Economic Panel. Our approach also serves the possibility to discriminate between the disability state pension (AAW) and the disability insurance for employees (WAO), which is not possible with the two other approaches. The oldage state pension (AOW) is underestimated by 4 qo, whereas the widow state pension (AWW)
is overestimated by 7 qo by NEDYMAS. This is the consequence of an underrepresentation of the aged abroad who receive an AOW benefit, whereas the simulated number of widowed persons is too high [see Nelissen (1991) 
Results.
To determine the redistributional effects of the social security system, we look at the following:
(1) the average lifetime wages and the average benefits from and contributions to the social security schemes by decile; (2) the net effect of the contributions and benefits on the income distribution, as measured by the Theil coefficient; (3) the Lorenz curves.
We look first into which income groups pay the contributions and which income groups receive the benefits. To that end, we look at the contributions and benefits by decile. The deciles are based on before-tax income. Table 3 shows the distribution of the contributions by decile. It concerns contributions by both employees and employers.
[ INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE ]
The table shows that the percentual proportion is larger, the higher the income is. The difference between the highest and lowest decile is larger for the annual figures. This particularly holds for the employees' insurances. This is because, on an annual basis the lowest deciles are mainly populated by non-employees, like the aged, the unemployed and students.
On the other hand, almost everyone is eventually involved with wage income and consequently with the payment of contributions to the employees' insurances on a lifetime basis. In particular, due to the fact that we deal with equivalent income streams.
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE ]
Whereas the differences between the annual approach and the lifetime approach are limited, with respect to the contributions, the benefits, on the contrary, show a large difference; see Table   4 . On a lifetime basis, the benefits are rather gradually divided. The deciles 2, 3 and 4
proportionally receive most. However, as said, the difference is small. Decile 10 receives 8 q if we look at the sum of general insurances, employees' insurances and social assistance (the lowest panel of Table 4 ), whereas decile 2 and 3 receive 12 qo (cohort 1930) or 13 q (cohort 1950). On an attnual basis, the benefits are far more concentrated. Now decile 2 receives 19 q of total benefits and decile 22 qo . On the other hand, decile 8 and 9 receive only 5 qo and decile 10 as little as 4 qo.
Looking at the redistributive impact of the social security system, one major problem in comparing annual and lifetime income redistribution is that situations can occur in which people do not have an income, or have a negative income. This holds in particular for the annual redistributive impact where a large part of the population does not have primary income. Nill incomes do not form a problem, when using the Theil coefiicient [see Theil (1967) and Odink (1985: 47-48) ]. The Theil coefficient has been defined as:
T-~. ( X~IY). I n( X;. N~Y)
where N equals the number of income recipients, Y the sum of all incomes and X; the income of the i-th person (i-1,...Nj. It now holds that:
limx-0(X;~Y).In(X;.NIY) -0
This implies that nill incomes carry the weight zero in the summation. But, it does not imply that the group of nill incomes can be neglected. The difference between incorporation and omission equals:~(
X;IY).In(X~.NIY)-~(X;IY).In((N-No).X;~Y)-In(NI(N-No))-No~N
in which No equals the number of nill incomes. This implies that the resulting error as a consequence of the omission of nill incomes amounts to:
Another recognized problem in comparing income distributions, i.e. the presence of negative incomes, does not occur in our application, because we do not take capital income into account.
The redistributive effect of a scheme has been measured via a comparison with the before-tax income. For example, the impact of the AOW benefit for 1991 in Table 5 , being -29.0~, equals the procentual difference between the Theil coefficient for the before-tax income and the Theil coefficient for the before-tax income minus the AOW benefits. The former amounts to 0.3021 and the latter to 0.4255. So, we get (0.3021 -0.4255)~0.4255 --29.0 q. Thus, inclusion of the AOW benefits will decrease the Theil coefficient by 29.0 q.
[ INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE ]
The redistributive impact for the social security benefits is shown for both the annual figures (1991) and the cohort figures (1930 and 1950) in the upper panel of Table 5 . We find that the old-age state pension (AOW) has a very large effect on annual basis (-29.0 qo), whereas the effect on lifetime basis is both smaller and decreasing (-15.1~for cohort 1930 and -5.2 q for cohort 1950). Here, we see most clearly the veiling effect of an annual approach. The annual effect is large because the AOW benefit is paid to about 15 qo of the total population.
About one third of this group does not have other income sources, whereas also about one third has an additional income that is at least half the benefit. On lifetime basis, the AOW is less important. Then, it only forms about 12 qo for cohort 1930 and 6 q for cohort 1950, respectively, of (equivalent discounted) lifetime income. Consequently, the redistributive impact decreases. The widow state pension (AWW) only has a limited effect, both on annual and lifetime basis. This is, among other things, due to its limited size. It is the smallest scheme involved. The annual redistributive impact is also larger than the lifetime effect. But, the (proportional) difference is smaller than that for the AOW. One explanation for this could be that widowed men can also claim an AWW benefit and these men generally have additional income. The latter would also explain the differences between the two cohorts, as this possibility -5.7 q) . The occupational pensions show a rather extraordinary picture. On an annual basis, they seem to decrease income inequality, whereas on a lifetime basis they enlarge income inequality. In the annual approach, the benefit goes towards persons without labour income and with only a basic pension (the AOW). So, the effect should be an income equalizing effect. But, looking at the lifetime income, we find that persons with a high (labour) lifetime income, also have large occupational pension benefits. So, the effect is actually the opposite one. The difference between the two cohorts can be explained by the nature of the largest part of the occupational pensions in the Netherlands. Most of them are based on the final-pay principle and for the older cohort this will result in proportional high back-service gains. This is in particular advantageous for high-income earners.
The impact of the contributions for the various schemes is given in the lower panel of Table 5 .
Because of the existence of a maximum contribution amount (ceiling), the contributions for the social insurances have a regressive nature. The contributions for the general insurances increase income inequality. This increase is larger on an annual basis. On a lifetime basis the income inequality enlarging effect generally is somewhat smaller for the younger cohort. The latter implies that the increase of the contribution rates has been more than compensated by the size of the discount rate. We find one exception: the AAW. This can be explained by the decrease of the general revenue financing in this scheme and the large increase in the contribution rate.
Therefore, the younger generation paid considerably more than the older one. From 1989, the financing of the family allowances (AKW) does not take place via a contribution rate but is financed by state via the taxes. We therefore do not report a figure for the year 1991.
The employee insurances show a somewhat different picture. With exception of the health cost insurance (ZFW), the annual effect is smaller than the lifetime effect. Probably this is caused by the circumstance that on an annual basis only employees pay this type of contributions, whereas on a lifetime basis almost everyone has been confronted with payments for employee insurances. This also explains the exception for the ZFW. ZFW contributions also have to be paid by recipients of social assistance benefits and part of the retired persons. The unemployment insurance (WW) shows hardly differences between the annual and cohort figures.
They enlarge income inequality to a small degree. The disability insurance (WAO) shows a different picture. The contributions within a year hardly affect income inequality (and even diminish income inequality), whereas the lifetime contributions enlarge income inequality somewhat. The regressive nature of the contributions has been lowered by the existence of an exemption. The employee insurance contributions together have an income inequality enlarging effect. The annual effect is smaller than the lifetime effect. The difference in lifetime impact between the two types of insurances, given the amounts involved is strikingly small. This small difference between the general and employee insurances can be explained by the level of the ceiling. The existence of a ceiling results in an increase of income inequality and the lower the ceiling, the larger the increase is. Looking at the general and employee insurances together, we find a very limited difference between the annual and lifetime redistributive impact. The contributions for the occupational pensions show a completely different picture. They lower income inequality, which is due to the existence of a contribution exemption and often no ceiling. Then, the effect is income equalizing. The difference between the annual and lifetime approach has been limited, but is somewhat larger for cohort 1930.
[ INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE ]
The result for both benefits and contributions (the net benefit) is shown in Table 6 . Table 6 also reports the effect of the discount rate. We first discuss the results for the 4 qo discount rate. The net benefit from the old-age state pension (AOW) results in a large redistribution on an annual basis (-25.1~). For cohort 1930, the effect is still large (although considerably smaller)
whereas it almost disappears for cohort 1950. The point being that the intra-personal transfers increase, whereas the intergenerational transfers decline; see Nelissen (1995) . If we look at the results for other discount rates (the last four columns of Table 6 ) we find for the general insurances (with the exception of the AWW for cohort 1950) that a lower discount rate generally results in a larger redistributive impact on cohort basis, whereas a higher one results in the opposite. The explanantion for this is rather straightforward: benefits are generally received at higher ages, whereas for contributions it is the opposite. This means that benefits (contributions) are valuated lower (higher) when the discount rate increases and vice versa. This also explains why the WAO follows the same pattern, whereas the pattern is reversed (ZW) or unclear (WW and ZFW) for the other employee insurances. Here, benefits and contributions take place during working life. WAO benefits are generally received at on average higher ages.
General and employee insurances together show an income inequality decreasing effect if the discount rate decreases, whereas the reverse effect holds in case of an increase of the discount rate.
The effect of a changing discount rate is not sharp for the social assistance benefits (ABW).
Both a higher and lower discount rate result in an income inequality decreasing effect for cohort
1930, whereas cohort 1950 shows an income inequality increasing effect. For the occupational pensions we find the reverse effect. Looking at the effect for all social security schemes together on the Theil coefiicient (indicated by the row called 'Before-tax income') we find that a higher discount rate results in a smaller redistributive impact of the social security system, whereas the opposite holds for a lower discount rate.
[ INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE ]
The effect of economic growth can be found in Table 7 . Here, we confront our findings hitherto The concerning Gini and Concentration indices have been given in Table 8 . They refer to a growth rate of 2 qo and a 4 q discount rate.
[ INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE ] 6. Evaluation Evaluation of the redistributive impact of the social security system is generally limited to its annual incidence. For the most part it is assumed that the redistributive impact on a lifetime basis is smaller than annual incidence studies find [see e.g. Layard (1977) and Reynolds and Smolensky (1977) ]. It is also clear that the incidence will differ among generations. However, because of lack of (longitudinal) data, no empirical studies in this field are available. Here, this problem has been solved for the Netherlands by using microsimulation. The applied model, called NEDYMAS -which stands for NEtherlands DYnamic Micro-Analytic Simulation model [see Nelissen (1991 Nelissen ( , 1993 Nelissen ( and 1994 ] -is a dynamic cross-sectional model. The resulting income components have been adjusted for the household composition (via the equivalence scale) and the resulting amounts have been adjusted for changes in the wage index and discounted to 1990, using a discount rate of 4 q.
The microsimulation approach appears to result in a coverage that is much more extensive than that by the Income Statistics or panel studies. To determine the redistributional effects of the social security system, we look at the following: (1) the average lifetime wages and the average benefits from and contributions to the social security schemes by decile; (2) the effect of the contributions and benefits on the income distribution as measured by the Theil coefficient; (3) the Lorenz curves. All three measures confirm that the redistributive impact on a lifetime basis s Note, that both the annual and lifetime figures are based on equivalent income. is considerably smaller in comparison with annual data. In particular, the old-age state pension (AOW) has a considerably higher impact on an annual basis than on a lifetime basis. This is also partly true for the occupational pensions. But all other social security schemes also show a higher redistributive impact for the annual approach. The differences appear to be larger for the general insurances ( which have flat-rated benefits and wage-related contributions) than for the employee insurances ( where both benefit and contributions are wage-related). Social assistance also has a large impact on a lifetime basis and its impact declines over cohorts just as this holds for the other schemes.
If we take the results for other discount rates (the last four columns of Table 6 ) we find that a lower discount rate results for all schemes together in a larger redistributive impact on cohort basis, whereas a higher one results in the opposite. The explanation for this is rather straightforward: benefits are generally received at higher ages, whereas for contributions it is the opposite. This also explains the deviating results for the employee insurances. The effect is not clear for the social assistance benefits and the occupational pensions.
Economic growth also effects the results. The impact differs among the various schemes and there is no clear picture.
Summarizing, we can conclude that our analysis confirms the theoretical notion that the lifetime redistributive impact of the social security system is smaller than the annual incidence suggests.
In particular for the old-age pensions and social assistance and to a lesser extent for the disability state pension. We also find that the younger the cohort is the larger the difference is.
However, our analysis also shows that this does not necessarily hold for the employee insurances, where the distribution of benefits and contributions differs less by age than for the aforementioned schemes holds. Here, horizontal redistribution aspects play a larger role. The Socio-Economic Panel only asks net income. As a consequence, n ts not poss~ble [o give amounts involved. Therefore, we give the deviation in number of benefit recipients. Source: Department of Social Affairs ( 1993), Muffels, et. al (1990) and Nelissen ( 1993) .
